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# JOINT RESEARCH TO 
INFORM JOINT VISIONS
Kristie Evenson - Freedom House  
Identifying and taking on constructive and
mutual-interest research is never an easy task. In
the current environment of Southeast Europe,
the research endeavors put forward by the
European Movement in Serbia and KIPRED in
Kosovo are particularly notable in their effort to
articulate the shared interest of people in Kosovo
and Serbia to achieve European standards on the
movement of people and goods.
The efforts of both organizations and their
advisors from the Civic Dialogue should be com-
mended not only for their first step in producing
joint research, but in their efforts to address this
research to policy makers from the region, as well
as the international community. Regional leader-
ship and ownership of the many reforms that are
needed is critical to achieve the stated objective of
eventual European integration.
This report is a first step of not only informing
policy makers, but in engaging the general public
in advocating for reform measures. Working with
local partners, it is hoped that this report will
serve as a basis for the communities to advocate
for concrete policy recommendations and work
towards adoption and implementation of these
provisions. And as this report gets debated and
discussed, we hope it can serve as a model for
other regional efforts that use research-based pol-
icy advocacy as their basis for shared visions
towards European standards and integration.
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# FORWARD
# GETTING OUT 
OF THE GHETTO
Ivan Krastev - Regional Advisor 
to the project (Centre for Liberal  Strategies)
The policies of the international community
with respect to the Balkans sometimes grimly
resemble the story of the man who lost his key in
the middle of the night and started to look for it
under the street lamp - not because he lost it
there, but because searching under a lamp is easi-
er than searching in the dark. Similarly, the inter-
national community tends to look for the key to
solve the Balkan crisis not where it was lost.
For the last decade, most of the policies of the
international community in the Balkans have been
supply driven. Conversely here comes a report writ-
ten jointly by two of the most respected think tanks
in the region in cooperation with Freedom House
that urges the policy makers to look at the demand
side. The report is thoughtful and forward looking
and its recommendations are based on solid empir-
ical research and respect for local knowledge.
The Report proves some of our worst fears. It
is not simply that the Western Balkans risk turning
into a ghetto on the outskirts of the European
Union: even worse, they risk becoming a ghetto
consisting of ghettos. Throughout the years fol-
lowing the Kosovo war, both Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians have felt more isolated and inward look-
ing than in the beginning of the 90s. The feeling of
marginalization and lack of perspective is particu-
larly strong among the young generation: the
Europe they see is defined by the Schengen wall.
This report does not fuel the illusion that fix-
ing the Balkans could be a short-term effort. It is,
however, far from gloomy in its evaluation of the
possibilities for change. It suggests that reconcil-
iation between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians is
possible, but only in the framework of European
integration. Regional integration is not an alterna-
tive to European integration: it is by opening to
the EU that Serbs and Albanians will open to
each other. And it is through the free movement
of people and goods that reconciliation can take
place.
Shocked by the riots in France and the bomb-
ings in London, key European policy makers may
be tempted to put this report aside for quieter
times. Doing so would miss an opportunity to
realize that the problem of the Balkans and the
problem in the outskirts of Paris are one and the
same: integration versus marginalization. Young
and ambitious Europeans are trying to get out of
the ghetto.
5
6# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the European Union (EU) focuses its efforts
on streamlining the four freedoms of its single mar-
ket, its neighbors to the southeast conversely expe-
rience a daily reality of a further restriction of
movement even as the region edges closer to the
European Union integration processes. These
restrictions are the product of years of unclear poli-
cies between and vis-a-vis Belgrade and Pristina and
have resulted in an increasingly ghettoized Balkans
within the West Balkans. Freedom of movement of
goods and people of Serbia1 and Kosovo is not har-
monized, transparent, or sustainable in its current
arrangement. And irrespective of the outcomes of
the Kosovo status talks, a clearer and coordinated
approach on freedom of movement of goods and
people by the respective administrations in Pristina
and Belgrade and from the EU is urgently needed in
order to ensure that economic and social considera-
tions support rather than undermine the ongoing
political negotiations.
This report developed jointly by think tanks, the
European Movement in Serbia (EMinS) in
Belgrade, and the Kosovar Institute for Policy
Research and Development (KIPRED) in Pristina
brings together for the first time comparative trade
and movement data which highlight a number of
clear areas of concern for authorities in the region
and the International Community.
1 Since a different set of regulations is in place in Montenegro in relation to Kosovo, this paper specifically focuses on the
Government of Serbia and the Kosovo Administration rather than on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo.
# REZIME
U trenutku kada Evropska unija (EU) svoje napore
usredsre|uje na unapre|ivanje ~etiri slobode na svom
jedinstvenom tr`i{tu, njeni susedi na jugoistoku imaju
potpuno suprotno iskustvo - svakodnevno se suo~avaju
sa daljim ograni~enjima kretanja, uprkos tome {to je
region sve bli`e u integrativnim procesima Evropske
unije. Ograni~enja su plod dugogodi{nje nejasne poli-
tike izme|u Beograda i Pri{tine i prema Beogradu i
Pri{tini i dovela su do poja~ane getoizacije Balkana
unutar Zapadnog Balkana. Sloboda kretanja robe i ljudi
u Srbiji1 i na Kosovu nije harmonizovana, nije transpar-
entna niti je odr`iva u svom sada{njem vidu. Sem toga,
bez obzira na ishod razgovora o statusu Kosova, hitno
je potrebno da vlasti u Pri{tini i Beogradu, kao i u EU,
prihvate jedan jasniji i koordinisani pristup slobodi kre-
tanja robe i ljudi, kako bi ekonomski i socijalni razlozi
bili podr{ka aktuelnim politi~kim pregovorima, umesto
da te pregovore podrivaju.
Ovaj izve{taj su zajedni~ki sa~inili Evropski pokret u
Srbiji (EPuS) u Beogradu i Kosovski institut za politi~ka
istra`ivanja i razvoj (KIPRED) u Pri{tini i u njemu se
prvi put na jednom mestu mogu na}i uporedni podaci
o trgovini i kretanju; ti podaci osvetljavaju izvestan broj
problema koji izazivaju o~itu zabrinutost vlasti u
regionu i me|unarodne zajednice.
# Status quo u viznom i trgovinskom re`imu ne}e
predstavljati podr{ku po~etku razgovora o statusu
Kosova i ostvarenju {irih ciljeva regionalne saradnje
1Budu}i da je u Crnoj Gori na snazi druga~iji niz odredaba i propisa u odnosu na Kosovo, u ovom radu smo se konkretno usred-
sredili na Vladu Srbije i administraciju Kosova, a ne na dr`avnu zajednicu Srbije i Crne Gore i Kosovo.
# PËRMBLEDHJE
Ne kohën kur Bashkësia Evropiane përqëndron
mundimet e saja në reformimin e katër lirive të
tregut të saj të vetëm, ne anën tjetër fqinjët e saj ne
jug-lindje përjetojnë një realitet ditor të kufiz-
imeve të mëtutjeshme të lëvizjes, edhe pse regjioni
është duke u afruar proceseve të integrimit në
Bashkësinë Evropiane.
Këto kufizime janë produkt i viteve të tëra me
politika të paqarta ndërmjet dhe përgjatë
Beogradit dhe Prishtinës dhe kanë rezultuar në një
Ballkan të getoizuar përbrenda Ballkanit përëndi-
mor. Liria e lëvizjes e mallrave dhe njerëzve të
Serbisë dhe Kosovës nuk është e harmonizuar,
transparente apo e qëndrueshme nën rregullimin
aktual. Dhe pa marr parasysh  rezultatet e bised-
imeve për statut të Kosovës, një qasje më e qartë
dhe e koordinuar në lirinë e lëvizjes të mallrave
dhe njerëzve të Serbisë1 dhe Kosovës nga admin-
istratat përkatëse në Prishtinë dhe Beograd dhe
prej BE-së është urgjentisht e nevojshme në
mënyre që të sigurohet që mendimet ekonomike
dhe sociale të përkrahin më shumë se sa që i pen-
gojnë negociatat politike të vazhdueshme.
Ky raport i zhvilluar nga dy “think tenka”,
Lëvizja Evropiane në Sërbi (EMinS) dhe Instituti
Kosovar për Hulumtime dhe Zhvillime të
Politikave (KIPRED) në Prishtinë gërsheton për
herë të parë të dhëna krahasuese në tregëti dhe
lëvizje që theksojnë një numër të qartë të lëmive
1Pasi një terësi e veçantë e rregullave është në fuqi në Mal të Zi në relacion me Kosovën, ky punim përqendrohet  në legjislacionin e Serbisë dhe të
Kosovës, dhe jo në atë të Unionin shtetëror të Serbisë dhe Malit të Zi.
7# Status quo in the visa and trade regimes will
undermine rather than support the start of the
Kosovo status talks and larger objectives of region-
al integration and European standards.
# The mechanisms for "free trade" between
Kosovo and Serbia are not producing free trade
but, rather, limited trade.
# The trade policies are not meeting objectives
either for free trade or in supporting economic
development as further criminalization of the two
economies is partly a result of this totally unregulat-
ed trade.
# The current visa regimes discourage travel
between Kosovo and Serbia and the region,
strengthening stereotypes and further isolating the
populations of Kosovo and Serbia from the region
and Europe.
The actual trade regime encourages increasing
expansion of the gray economies on respective sides
of the administrative border, leading to a further eth-
nic-based middleman rather than economic incen-
tives for entrepreneurs to develop legal businesses.
This hampers regional development perspectives and
distorts the competitive advantages of the Kosovar
and Serbian economies.
Considering the movement of people, opinion-
poll findings from both Serbia and Kosovo demon-
strate a remarkably isolated set of populations,
which have the inevitable stereotyped perceptions of
their neighbors and which contribute to the psycho-
i evropskih standarda, ve} }e podriti te razgovore i
te ciljeve.
# Mehanizmi za "slobodnu trgovinu" izme|u Kosova
i Srbije zapravo ne omogu}avaju slobodnu, ve}
ograni~enu trgovinu.
# Mere trgovinske politike ne doprinose ostvarivanju
slobodne trgovine, niti pru`aju podr{ku ekonomskom
razvoju, budu}i da je dalja kriminalizacija dveju privre-
da jednim delom rezultat ba{ te potpuno neregulisane
trgovine.
# Sada{nji vizni re`im obeshrabruje putovanje
izme|u Kosova i Srbije i putovanje u regionu,
osna`uje stereotipe i jo{ vi{e izoluje stanovni{tvo
Kosova i Srbije od ~itavog tog regiona i od Evrope.
Postoje}i trgovinski re`im ohrabruje ekspanziju sive
ekonomije i s jedne i s druge  strane administrativne
granice, {to potom dovodi do pojave posrednika na
osnovu etni~ke pripadnosti, a ne do ekonomskih ini-
cijativa koje bi podsticale preduzetnike u razvijanju
zakonitog poslovanja. Ovo ko~i perspektive region-
alnog razvoja i umanjuje komparativne prednosti
kosovske i srpske privrede.
Sa stanovi{ta kretanja ljudi, rezultati istra`ivanja
javnog mnjenja i u Srbiji i na Kosovu ukazuju na izraz-
ito izolovana stanovni{tva koja neminovno imaju
stereotipne percepcije o svojim susedima, a to samo
po sebi doprinosi psiholo{kom pesimizmu najve}eg
dela stanovni{tva. Mladi ljudi i obrazovani stru~njaci
sve su vi{e izolovani ne samo od svojih kolega u EU,
ve} i od kolega u Jugoisto~noj Evropi (JIE). Ta dalja
getoizacija ve} getoiziranog regiona Zapadnog
për shqetësim për autoritetet në regjion dhe
Bashkësinë Ndërkombëtare.
# Status kuoja në regjimet e vizave dhe tregëti do
të pengojë, në vend që të përkrahë, fillimin e
bisedimeve të statusit të Kosovës si dhe qëllimeve
më të mëdha të integrimeve regjionale dhe stan-
dardeve Evropiane.
#  Mekanizmat për “tregëti të lirë” ndërmjet
Kosovës dhe Sërbisë nuk janë duke prodhuar
tregëti të lirë mirëpo tregëti të kufizuar
# Politikat e tregëtisë nuk i takojnë objektivat për
tregëti të lirë osë për përkrahjen e zhvillimeve
ekonomike, me kiriminalizimin e mëtutjeshëm të
dy ekonomive dhe shteteve që është pjesërisht
rezultat i kësaj tregëtie plotësisht të parregulluar.
#  Viza regjimet aktuale dekurajojnë udhëtimin
ndërmjet Kosovës dhe Sërbisë dhe regjionit, për-
forcojnë stereotipet dhe izolojnë mëtutje popul-
latat e Kosovës dhe Sërbisë nga regjioni dhe
Evropa.
Regjimi aktual i tregëtisë inkurajon ekspanzion-
in në rritje të ekonomive gri në anët përkatëse të
kufirit administrativ, duke drejtuar edhe mëtutje
në ndërmjetësuesit në baza etnike se sa në stimu-
lanse ekonomike për ndërmarrës të zhvillojnë biz-
nese legjitime. Kjo pengon perspektivat zhvil-
limore të regjionit dhe deformon përparësit
konkuruese të ekonomive Kosovare dhe Sërbe.
Duke pas parasysh lirinë e lëvizjes, rezultatet e
hulumtimit të opinionit publik nga Sërbia dhe
Kosova demonstrojnë terësi të jashtzakonshme të
popullatave të izoluara, që pashmangshëm kanë per-
8logical pessimism felt by a majority of the popula-
tions. Young people and skilled professionals are
increasingly isolated not only from their EU col-
leagues but from counterparts within Southeast
Europe (SEE). This further ghettoization of the
already ghettoized region of the West Balkans pro-
vides little opportunity for domestic populations to
modify political extremism or to advocate for a
middle course in their respective efforts to adopt
European standards.
Recommendations focus on encouraging
European-standards implementation in both
Belgrade and Pristina, with the facilitation of this
process targeted at Brussels and the Contact Group.
Recommendations include the:
# Placement of trade and visa regimes at the top
of the negotiations agenda. Discussions on trade
regulations and ID standards and visa regimes
should start as soon as possible.
# Commitment by the governments of Serbia and
Kosovo to enact and/or harmonize existing trade
and visa regime legislation according to the princi-
ples of Freedom of Movement and Trade in the
SEE region.
# Commitment by SEE regional governments
and the EU to support the political and techni-
cal needs of both Kosovo and Serbia to harmo-
nize trade and visa regimes to European stan-
dards, including the introduction of positive dis-
crimination in allowing the movement of people
from Kosovo and Serbia within the region and
to the EU.
Balkana, ne daje mnogo mogu}nosti doma}em
stanovni{tvu da modifikuje svoj politi~ki ekstrem-
izam ili da se zala`e za srednji kurs u svojim napori-
ma za  usvajanje evropskih standarda.
Preporuke su fokusirane na podsticanje primene
evropskih standarda i u Beogradu i u Pri{tini, uz
istovremeno obra}anje Briselu i Kontakt grupi s
pozivom da olak{aju taj proces.
Preporuke obuhvataju slede}e:
# Stavljanje trgovinskog i viznog re`ima u sam vrh
programa pregovora. Diskusije o trgovinskoj regula-
tivi i standardima za li~na dokumenta, kao i o viznim
re`imima trebalo bi da po~nu {to je pre mogu}e.
# Opredeljenje vlada Srbije i Kosova da donesu i/ili
harmonizuju postoje}e zakonodavstvo kojim su reg-
ulisani trgovinski i vizni re`im u skladu sa na~elima
slobode kretanja i trgovine u oblasti Jugoisto~ne
Evrope.
# Opredeljenje regionalnih vlada jugoisto~ne
Evrope i EU da podr`e politi~ke i tehni~ke potrebe i
Kosova i Srbije u usagla{avanju trgovinskih i viznih
re`ima sa evropskim standardima, uklju~uju}i tu
uvo|enje pozitivne diskriminacije kako bi se ljudima
sa Kosova i iz Srbije omogu}ilo da putuju po regionu
i da putuju u EU.
cepcione me stereotype për fqinjët dhe që kontri-
bon ne pesimizmin psikologjik që ndjehet nga shu-
mica e popullatës. Njerëzit e rinj dhe profesionistët
janë mëtutje të izoluar jo vetëm nga kolegët e tyre të
Evropës Përëndimore mirëpo edhe nga homologët
e tyre të Evropës Jug-Lindore. Ky getoizim i mëtut-
jeshëm i një regjioni edhe ashtu të getoizuar të
Balllkanit Përëndimor ofron pak mundësi pëe pop-
ullatat vendase të modifikojnë ekstremizmin politik
dhe të avokojnë për rrugë të mesme në tentimet e
tyre përkatëse të adaptimit të standardeve evropiane.
Rekomandimet përqëndrohen në inkurajimin e
implementimint të standardeve Evropiane si në
Beograd ashtu edhe në Prishtinë me mundësimin
e këtij procesi nga Brukseli dhe Kontakt Grupi
Rekomandimet përfshijnë:
# Vendosjen e regjimeve të tregëtisë dhe të vizave
në maje të agjendës të negociatave. Diskutimet
mbi rregulativat e tregëtisë dhe stadardeve të
dokumenteve personale dhe regjimi i vizave duhet
të fillojnë sa më shpejtë.
# Premtim për dedikim nga qeveritë e Sërbisë dhe
Kosovës që të aktivizojnë dhe/apo të harmonizo-
jnë legjislaturën egzistuese të regjimeve të tregëtisë
dhe të vizave sipas parimeve të Lirisë së Lëvizjes
dhe Tregëtisë ne regjionin e Evropës Jug-Lindore
# Premtim për dedikim nga qeveritë e regjionit të
Evropës Jug-Lindore dhe të BE-së të përkrahin
nevojat politike dhe teknike të Kosovës dhe
Sërbisë në harmonizimin e regjimeve të tregëtisë
dhe vizave në nivel të standardeve Evropiane,
përfshirë këtu edhe futjen e diskriminimit pozitiv
në lejimin e lëvizjes të njerëzve nga Kosova dhe
Sërbia përbrenda regjionit dhe në BE.
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1244 put Kosovo under UN administration after
the conflict of 1999, creating a UN administration
(UNMIK) for basic oversight of Kosovo. The
Resolution was designed as an interim solution in
order to bring peace, stability, and democratic
institutions, as well as pave the way for status talks.
In the meantime, the relations between Kosovo
and Serbia1 have not seen any noticeable improve-
ment, even while both administrations have made
separate economic and political agreements with
their SEE neighbors.
This paper addresses one of the most difficult
issues on the Western Balkan European agenda-that
of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. As sta-
tus talks begin, considerations on both sides are
aimed at delivering political solutions deemed
acceptable by constituencies in Kosovo and Serbia.
Yet the everyday lives of residents are mostly
focused on socioeconomic concerns, which are
unlikely to improve in the near future if the status
quo persists. Without specific attention to providing
enabling legal environments that encourage socioe-
conomic development with an eye towards
European standards and integration, real positive
changes in the everyday lives of the people of
Kosovo and Serbia are likely to be minimal.
Even as the Western Balkan countries remain
fragmented and present a major challenge for the
growing European Union, they have explicitly
shown their dedication to future integration into
the EU. Political support for integration on all
sides provides a unique opportunity to now put in
place a number of key building blocks of
European standards, even as the process of even-
tual integration is likely to take many years.
Besides stability, democratization, and overall eco-
nomic development in the region, committed
regional cooperation is critical to the European
integration process. The region, faced with similar
or identical challenges, must act in close coopera-
tion and share experiences in order to reach the
level of development necessary to finally achieve
long lasting stability, peace, and join the European
family of nations.
Given this context, the concept underpinning
the joint research is that the establishment of EU
standards in the liberalization of the movement of
goods and people in Serbia and Kosovo is an
incentive for the economic growth and normaliza-
tion of the region and its integration into EU
structures.
The research project focuses on two areas of
movement. One is the identification of the cur-
rent scope of trade flows between Kosovo and
Serbia, as well as existing regulations and possible
obstacles in its intensification.
Secondly, researchers explore peoples' percep-
tions on a number of issues related to the concept
and practice of free movement of people, as well
as the administrative restrictions between Kosovo
and Serbia, within the Western Balkan region, and
with the EU.
Finally, the research reflects the region's firm
determination and expectation to join the
European family, an aspiration shared by the
majority of the population as shown by our
research and many others. The research set the
EU as the reference point and model of peaceful
cooperation regarding regional development and
integration, identifying problems that demand
Europe's greater attention. Through offering a
number of practical policy and technical sugges-
tions on how to create political good will on both
sides, the project aims to decrease difficulties in
travel and trade, which are vital to the larger
process of reconciliation, stabilization, and inte-
gration of the West Balkan region.
The research targets various stakeholders but
primarily attempts to reach the Government of
the Republic of Serbia, UNMIK, and the Kosovo
Government, as well as the International
Community, most importantly the EU and the
United States. Also, since it deals with the prob-
lems and perceptions of several subsectors-such
as youth, expert community, and business-it pro-
vides useful information for scholars dealing with
these sectors of the societies in question. It is the
hope of the researchers that these findings will
also be useful to civil society in helping to serve as
a basis for public campaigns in order to foster
mutual exchanges, understanding, and coopera-
tion between Kosovo and Serbia.
The idea for the research occurred during the
activities of a regional civil society initiative, the Civic
Dialogue2, the aim of which was to unite the civil
society efforts for the benefit of a common
European perspective of the region. KIPRED and
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# CONTEXT
1Serbia is part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro; however, for purposes of this research, the term Serbia is used to describe the relations of
the Republic of Serbia and the Kosovo Administration given that Montenegro, to some extent, has conducted parallel relations with Kosovo.
2Civic Dialogue (CiD) is a nonpartisan, multiethnic initiative of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from Serbia and Kosovo established by the
Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad and the Mother Theresa Society from Pristina. It engages over 250 NGOs from Kosovo, Serbia,
and other parts of the former Yugoslavia. http://www.civil-dialogue.org
EMinS made an effort to research the common
problems in the perspective of future EU member-
ship-more specifically, the free movement of goods
and people. This pioneering research has employed
local capacities to explore the problems of immedi-
ate interest to the residents of Kosovo and Serbia
and the issues fundamentally important for the
future European perspective of the region.
The strength of this report rests on the accura-
cy and efforts of its authors. This project could
not be realized without the ongoing advice of
Ivan Krastev of the Centre for Liberal Strategies
(CLS) of Sofia, the partnership of Freedom
House Europe in Budapest and Freedom House
Serbia in Belgrade, and the support of regional
and bilateral USAID missions, the Charles Stewart
Mott Foundation, as well as the Balkan Trust for
Democracy.
# METHODOLOGY
Researchers jointly set out to develop and gather
information through both quantitative and qualita-
tive mechanisms on a parallel basis. A key objective
of the research was to provide comparable infor-
mation from both Kosovo and Serbia. While a
good portion of the data collected has been stud-
ied previously, this is the first time that data sets on
trade regimes of import and export between Serbia
and Kosovo could be cross-compared. This, com-
bined with a perceptions-based survey on the
movement of people conducted with the same
methodology in Kosovo and Serbia, field surveys
of businesspeople in the Sandzak region, and a
legal review of existing legislation on border and
trade regimes, provides a comprehensive assess-
ment of what is at best a murky and highly change-
able on-the-ground situation.
The extent of current trade flows between
Kosovo and Serbia and the existing impediments
for further development in the area of customs,
regulations, and trade regimes were analyzed
through an in-depth analysis of the customs
database and an extensive legal review of the
existing customs regulations in Kosovo/Serbia.
While trade data gathered from Serbian border
control and UNMIK were not exactly identical
(UNMIK data were more complete and identi-
fied according to EU standards), they provided
enough comparable data to identify a number of
trade trends as well as identify gaps where exist-
ing data sets on both sides fall short of describ-
ing the trade flows reality.
And in order to supplement the analysis of the
official sources on trade flows between Kosovo
and Serbia and examine the qualitative aspect of
the current regime and obstacles, EMinS engaged
regional trade experts in producing the case study.
The methodology included field interviews
with local transporters, producers, and business-
people from the southwestern Serbia/Sandzak
region. It aimed to explore the extent of business
with Kosovo in local trade and identify percep-
tions regarding the main obstacles in legal, cus-
toms, and administrative aspects to the intensifi-
cation of economic cooperation, as well as give
an estimate on the scope of illegal trade and
smuggling. The researcher interviewed 98
respondents (via questionnaires and parallel sur-
veys) in June and July 2005.
Research on the practice and perceptions of the
residents of Kosovo and Serbia regarding freedom
of movement between Kosovo and Serbia, as well
as towards EU countries, was conducted by the
Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute
(SMMRI) from Belgrade and Index Kosova from
Pristina, according to the methodology agreed
upon by EMinS and KIPRED. Besides general
population interviewing, it focused particularly on
three basic social groups: students, experts, and
businesspeople who were identified as drivers of
socioeconomic development and the main social
groups supporting European integration. The per-
ceptions survey gathered data from both the gener-
al public as well as the specific subgroups of uni-
versity students, experts, and businesspeople and
was devised to shed light on the issues of freedom
of movement, awareness of the existing regula-
tions and their beneficial or detrimental effect, and
other perceptions that presented the researchers
with a picture of both the current perceptions on
the issue and hopes for the future. In-depth knowl-
edge on research issues was provided via focus
groups. In total, a representational sample of 1,200
people in Serbia and 1,100 in Kosovo were inter-
viewed in public-opinion polls and focus groups.3
And, finally, a team of legal experts from
EMinS and KIPRED provided assessments of
the technical and legal requirements for the free
and secure movement of persons of both Serbia
and Kosovo.
10
3Respondents in Kosovo were generally Kosovo Albanians, whereas in Serbia they were a mixture of residents of Serbia.
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CHAPTER I 
SHATTERING THE ILLUSION
OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN
KOSOVO AND SERBIA
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# OVERVIEW
Free trade tests governments' ability to govern
their territories functionally and to the benefit of
their economic development and residents. Both
Kosovo and Serbia have managed to strike free-trade
agreements with other neighboring countries.
Residents of the region and beyond have few prob-
lems in goods transfers to Kosovo or to Serbia.
These factors suggest that both governments have
the ability to regulate and manage movement of
goods. Yet current legislative frameworks and gov-
ernment practices hamper residents of Kosovo and
Serbia from trading with and through each other and
from using this legitimate trade as a basis for mutu-
ally beneficial economic development. The assump-
tion of free trade, accordingly, is more accurately
described as 'limited trade.'
Kosovo and Serbia are two separate customs ter-
ritories and separate subjects of international trade,
with trade policy of Kosovo remaining under the
control of the UN. UNMIK treats Serbia as a sep-
arate customs territory, while the Government of
Serbia treats trade issues with Kosovo as part of the
larger frame defining Kosovo's final status. At the
same time, the political status of Kosovo as current-
ly governed by UN Resolution 1244 implies that
mutual trade flows between Kosovo and Serbia are
exempt from any customs duties except value-
added tax (VAT) payments. This has created in prac-
tice a situation where these two customs territories
do not have regulated trade relations.
Trade regimes of Serbia and
Kosovo in mutual trade
Serbia
# From the division of customs territory of
Kosovo in mid 1999 until 2001, there was no
regulation of trade between Serbia and Kosovo
on the part of Serbia. Only police services
were present on the Serbian sides of crossing
points. Customs duties were not charged on
products; rather, they were considered part of
intra-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia trade.
# In 2001, the first regulation on trade between
Serbia and Kosovo was adopted in Serbia. It
regulated only tax matters and the tax equaliza-
tion fee of 5 percent without addressing the
customs issue. (On the crossing points with
Kosovo, only police and the Tax
Administration of Serbia were present).
# In 2004, a regulation was adopted in Serbia which
regulated the transit of foreign goods through
Kosovo and defined domestic Kosovo products.
# With the introduction of VAT, which is deduct-
ed when the goods are exported to Kosovo, the
tax equalization rate was abolished at the begin-
ning of 2005.
Kosovo
# On August 31, 1999, UNMIK issued UNMIK
Regulation No. 1999/3 "On the establishment
of the Customs and other Related Services in
Kosovo." Due to the legal status of Kosovo, an
Administrative Direction levied no customs
duty for the goods originating from Serbia and
with Kosovo as the final destination.
# This specific feature is regulated under UNMIK
Administrative Direction No. 2001/7 on
"Implementing UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/3
on the establishment of the customs and other
related services in Kosovo," issued by UNMIK
on May 29, 2001.
# The provision implies that all goods originating
from Serbia were exempt from customs duty
payments and were only subject to value-added
tax (VAT) of 15 percent, which is collected at
the border. Because the legal status of Kosovo
is still unchanged, the customs regime remains
the same, with no customs duty and only VAT
levied on imports from Serbia to Kosovo. The
same applies symmetrically to exports, and
therefore no duty or tariff was levied by the
UNMIK authorities for products exported to
Serbia from Kosovo.
The lack of clear trade relations comes as no
surprise to actors in the region and the
International Community. Clarity and coordina-
tion have not been politically possible as long as
actors have directly connected examination of
this phenomenon with the status issue. And while
there has been some progress in eliminating ambi-
guity through subsequent legislation, coherent
trade regimes are not yet in place. What is striking
from a comparison of UNMIK and Serbian
administration data is that avoiding coherence and
convergence of trade policies has systematically
undermined the respective administrations of
1 The data from IMF were originally in USD and was converted to EUR using the exchange rate on 31.12.2004. (1EUR = 1,3538 USD).
2 Kosovo does not have any external debt as it yet does not know the debt amount to be inherited from the SCG succession,
to be determined after the status resolution.
Table 1. Basic economic indicators
needed revenues and contributed to the shaky
prospects of legitimate economic development in
both Serbia and Kosovo.
Economic and trade-flow backdrop
Trade between the smaller Kosovo and larger
Serbia remains starkly lopsided and, in many ways,
represents the distinct economic realities faced by
Kosovo and Serbia. Each was part of a larger eco-
nomic unit within the former Yugoslavia, but
even as they took divergent paths at the beginning
of the 1990s, the effects of conflict, isolation, and
slow or incorrect privatization processes and gov-
ernment administrations burdened both Serbia
and Kosovo4 with stymied production-capacity
potentials and trade deficits with the region and
the outside world.
Economic profiles of Serbia and Kosovo
Serbia is an emerging economy with an annual
GDP that places it in the lower-middle group of
world economies (World Bank categorization).
The period of transition and economic stagna-
tion from 1990 to 2001 has now been replaced
by a period of slow economic development.
Serbia has not yet reached the economic levels
of 1990. GDP growth in 2004 was substantial,
but the unemployment rate is also on the rise-
18.5 percent in 2004. One of the main problems
of the Serbian economy is a permanent and ris-
ing trade deficit. The external debt of Serbia is
rising as well; in 2004 it reached nearly 15 billion
USD, which categorizes Serbia as a severely
indebted economy.
Kosovo is an emerging economy with an annual
GDP that places it in the lower-middle group of
world economies. Kosovo's GDP recorded very
high growth in the first years after the conflict,
mainly due to large amounts of donor-related
inputs. Kosovo has a very young population
with an unemployment rate estimated at 30 per-
cent. The unemployment rate is still increasing
due to the economy's inability to generate
enough jobs to absorb new entries into the job
market. Due to its underdeveloped economy,
Kosovo is an import-driven economy, and its
exports are so minimal that they cover only 3.6
percent of its imports. Besides donor aid, a very
important indicator is workers' remittances,
which finance the consumption that leads to the
massive trade deficit noted above.
13
4Over 80 percent of consumer products were imported in the period after the conflict, and this share of imports in total consumption still remains
high. This situation has lasted longer than initially anticipated due to the slow development of UNMIK Pillar IV, decisions concerning former socially
owned enterprises (SOEs), and supporting an environment that will initiate the development of a new private sector.
INDICATORS Serbia and Montenegro1 Kosovo
GDP (bill. EUR) 15,264 17,725 2,426 2,516
GDP growth (rate in %) 2.7 7.2 4.7 3.7
Average net wage (EUR per month) 175 192 276 275
Unemployment (rate in %) 14.6 18.5 30 31
Exports f.o.b. (bill. EUR) 2.2 3.1 0.196              0.199
Imports c.i.f. (bill. EUR) 5.8 8.6 1.0 1.1
Trade balance (bill. EUR) - 3.6 - 5.5 - 0.812 - 0.848
External debt (bill. EUR) 10.5 11.0 -2 -
Source: International Monetary Fund
(excluding Kosovo)
2003 2004 2003 2004
With Serbia having an export surplus with
Kosovo, there has been a consistent upward
trend in documented trade between Kosovo and
Serbia since its low point during the conflict in
1999. According to UNMIK Customs Service
data, trade volume reached its peak in 2004,
when Serbian exports reached EUR 134 million,
while Kosovo exports were only at EUR 4.7 mil-
lion. This trend seems likely to continue based
on the projections of the first
quarter of 2005.
Followed by the destruction of
the production sector during the
conflict, Kosovo ended up as a con-
sumer society dependent on the
importing of anything and every-
thing. A good portion of these
imports have come from or through
Serbia to Kosovo.5 Serbian products
comprised approximately 10 per-
cent of the total imports of Kosovo
in 2004, with approximately 17 per-
cent of total imports into Kosovo
coming through Serbia.
At the same time, in key industries
such as construction, which was
previously mostly imported from
Serbia, Kosovo is building its pro-
duction capacities. The volume of Kosovo's
imports has changed rapidly in favor of the
domestic production of construction materials,
where an overall assessment indicates that about
40 percent of the domestic demand for con-
struction materials was supplied within Kosovo
in 2004.6
When speaking about Serbia's imports from
Kosovo or Kosovo exports to Serbia, this trade
flow is much lower than the trade flow from
Serbia to Kosovo, but it is growing as the two
become more important trading partners. In 2001,
imports from Kosovo to Serbia, according to data
provided by the Tax Administration of Serbia,
were only around EUR 780 thousand, but in the
next year they reached nearly EUR 3 million. In
2004, Kosovo's exports to Serbia reached nearly
EUR 7 million, which is almost 9 times higher
than in 2001 but still 9 times lower than Serbia's
exports to Kosovo (and substantially different
from corresponding UNMIK data).
Kosovo's exports of goods to Serbia, as part
of the trade flow, are much lower but show a
growing trend. In 2004, exports of goods from
Kosovo to Serbia covered 3.5 percent of
imports. Exports of Kosovo products to Serbia
were far less diversified than imports of Serbian
products to Kosovo, but the 2005 data show a
greater diversification of production in Kosovo,
including its exports. Yet it is far from a desir-
able level.
These data present only part of the larger
goods transfer between Serbia and Kosovo.
Comparable trade data from Serbian and
UNMIK authorities were collected and analyzed,
and even with allowances made for data coming
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Kosovo exports to Serbia were
recorded as EUR 6.9 million in
2004, according to Serbian 
statistics, and only EUR 
4.7 million according to UNMIK 
5UNMIK Customs data for 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 show that the share of imports of Serbian products in the total imports of Kosovo in
2004 was 10.32 percent. Another indicator of the close trade relationship between these two customs territories is that the share 
of trade-related border crossings (imports only) from Serbia to Kosovo amounts to 17.56 percent of the total.
6Please see Appendix A for a list of the top 10 imports/exports of Serbia and Kosovo.
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Trade between customs territories of Serbia and Kosovo
from slightly different periods and categories,7
they show clear discrepancies that suggest a thriv-
ing illegal trade scene between Kosovo and
Serbia. The two different data sets analyzed (a)
the Serbian Tax Administration (for 2003 and
2004) and Serbian Customs Administration (for
the first quarter of 2005) and (b) UNMIK
Customs service from 2004 and the first quarter
of 2005, which reveal a large discrepancy
between the values of goods exchanged between
Kosovo and Serbia (especially Serbian exports)
recorded by the two administrations. To a certain
extent, this discrepancy may be due to the differ-
ent systems of data collection.8
UNMIK has organized a classic customs
service with a detailed system to collect trade
data, while the Serbian authorities have treated
this as a tax-payment issue. Usually, a higher
percentage of duty-payment evasions occurs in
tax-payment procedures than in the payment of
customs duties, suggesting that UNMIK data
provide a more complete picture of the trade
activities.
According to the data, this problem seems
more prevalent on the Serbia side of the customs.
Less than 38 percent of Serbian exports to
Kosovo recorded in the UNMIK Customs
Service database seem to have paid their taxes in
Serbia. There is also a discrepancy in data on
Kosovo exports to Serbia, which was recorded as
EUR 6.9 million in 2004, according to Serbian
statistics, and only EUR 4.7 million according to
UNMIK evidence. Even if the trade flows
between the two customs territories are free of
any customs duties, the tax or tax equalization fee
must be paid; it appears that many of the busi-
nesses that traded with Kosovo bypassed this
requirement.
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7Through cooperation with the Tax Department Regional Centre Pristina, UNMIK, and the Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance, Republic of
Serbia, the researchers cross-compared data. The data analyzed come from different sources and cover different periods-the UNMIK Customs data are from
2004 and the first quarter of 2005, and the Serbian data cover the period of 1999 to March 2005. The differences between the analyzed data stem from the
fact that while UNMIK Customs has a centralized data gathering system, depicting each border-crossing point, the Serbian data collected after 1999 on trade
between Serbia and Kosovo are only for the tax payment purposes of the Tax Administration of Serbia.
The Serbian government, possibly due to status implications, treated Serbia's trade with Kosovo as internal trade, which is not included in the foreign-trade
statistics data gathering system. However, starting from 2005 the Customs Authority of Serbia started to collect data on trade between Serbia and Kosovo,
which is one reason why there are more detailed and precise data available now. Accordingly, for the period before 2005, the more reliable data prove to be
that collected from the UNMIK Customs.
8For example contrary to the data provided by the Serbian administration, according to UNMIK the major export of Kosovo is not scrap metal or paper but
wine, which represented the chief export from Kosovo to Serbia in the amount of EUR 725,000 in 2004. It was followed by exports of carpets (EUR
646,000) and heaters (EUR 609,000). All other exports are below half a million euros each but more or less well diversified by products.
Difference in Serbian data and UNMIK data on trade flows 
between Serbia and Kosovo in millions of EUR
1In absolute terms.
2UNMIK data for 2004 include trade of Serbia and Montenegro with Kosovo.
3Data for the first quarter of 2005.
Year Difference1 Difference
Serbian exports to Kosovo /
Kosovo imports from Serbia
Serbian imports from Kosovo /
Kosovo exports to Serbia
Serbian dataSerbian data UNMIK dataUNMIK data2
2003 35,5 142,1 106,6 5,4 6,0 0,6
2004 50,9 134,4 83,5 6,9 4,7 2,2
20053 63,7 23,8 39,9 1,8 0,6 1,2
This can be explained partly by inappropriate
evidence on re-export activities and partly by ille-
gal trade. This has clear implications in the ability
of the administrations in Kosovo and Serbia to
derive revenue from the trade flows as described
in the table below.
Trade crossings, transit areas,
and trade flows
Alternative border crossing points (BCPs) in
mutual trade contribute to this discrepancy in data.
In recent years, the number of crossings has
become more stabilized with the establishment of
five BCPs between Serbia and Kosovo, four of
these designated as commercial crossing points.
Yet, according to Serbian data sources, the number
of border crossings negatively correlates with the
trend in exports. The number of crossings
increased when exports fell and vice versa.
The role of Montenegro and Macedonia
This negative correlation can partially be
explained by the use of additional border cross-
ings with Montenegro and Macedonia. The vol-
ume of imports originating from Serbia is EUR
21 million higher if one counts the goods enter-
ing Kosovo through BCPs that link Kosovo with
other countries.9 The same phenomenon,
although in miniscule monetary volumes, is
recorded with Kosovo exports to Serbia. Most of
these goods cross the border in Hani i Elezit
(Djeneral Jankovic) or Peja/Pec (Kulla/Brnjacki)
border crossing points.
Kosovo as a point of entry
for third-country goods to Serbia
Another trend is the use of Kosovo as a transit
area for legitimate trade. Many goods that are
imported to Serbia come in transit through
Kosovo. These include sugar, meat and meat
products (especially poultry), cigarettes, and even
vegetables and fruits from Turkey and Greece.
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From seller in Sandzak to buyer in
Kosovo, the numerous controls and
customs checks can mean that the
process takes more than 40 hours for
a distance slightly more than 100km
9A comprehensive look at comparable data from Montenegro and Macedonia was not possible during this initial report, but it is hoped that subsequent
studies can include this additional data.
KOSOVO SERBIA
IMPORT from
Kosovo/Serbia
EXPORT to
Kosovo/Serbia
TRANSIT
IMPORT/Export from
Kosovo/Serbia
VAT
Customs Duties 
Customs Duties 
Excise
VAT
15%
None
None
Charged and later refunded
None
None
10% in general, but 
0% for Serbian products
Depends on specific
goods
18% general
8% preferential rate
VAT None None
No customs duties except
when a part of a shipment
for Serbia
NoneCustoms Duties 
Revenues from import and export under current regime
Many of these products are not properly con-
trolled when they enter Serbia at crossing points
with Kosovo. This is because only customs can
provide all the necessary controls needed for
these products, and such controls have only
begun to be applied by Serbian Customs begin-
ning in 2005.
Mitrovica is the most used border crossing
Out of the five BCPs between Kosovo and
Serbia, according to 2004 data, the crossing point
with the highest frequency of commercial cross-
ings was Mitrovica (including Zubin Potok,
Leposavic, and the Terminal in Mitrovica), with
over EUR 53.7 million in goods crossing from
Serbia to Kosovo during the observed period.
The trends indicate that border crossings in
Mitrovica (including Zubin Potok, Leposavic, and
the Terminal in Mitrovica) have increased their
share by 6 percent in overall imports in the first
quarter of 2005, both in number of crossings and
value of imported goods. This trend might be
partially explained by the fact that the majority
population of the region is the Serbian communi-
ty, suggesting that local Serbs are trading with
Serbia.10
The reality for those using the designated bor-
der crossings and procedures means engaging
with multiple borders and customs regimes that
regularly lead to confusion, lengthy delays, and a
lack of predictably. To bring this all into perspec-
tive, producers from Sandzak describe the envi-
ronment for doing business with Kosovo.
Perceptions of transporters/producers from
Sandzak regarding trade with Kosovo11
Regardless of the volume and mode of trans-
portation of goods to and from Kosovo, all
interviewees (98) stated that the present, indirect
way is unsustainable. Contributing to this posi-
tion is a summary of the comments made by the
transporters about the business environment in
which they operate:
# The flow of goods between these two areas is
carried out in an indirect way without direct
contact between the buyer and the seller. The
owners of the cargo vehicles have, due to
such circumstances, changed their professions
and become tradesmen.
# The free flow of people and goods is serious-
ly hampered by administrative practices. There
is an obligation to record goods when these
enter Kosovo, numerous controls by the traf-
fic police on the way to the administrative
border crossings to Kosovo, waiting, unload-
ing and loading on the administrative cross-
ings, numerous controls by the traffic police
in the part of Kosovo mainly populated by
Serbs, long waits at customs, unloading and
loading again, numerous controls by the
Kosovo police officers, UNMIK and KFOR
internal controls, which therefore to reach the
end buyer takes more than 40 hours for a dis-
tance slightly more than one hundred kilome-
ters. With the exception of UNMIK and
KFOR, professional standards for officials in
Kosovo and Serbia are low.
# The goods exported from Kosovo are mainly
paid in cash. The money transfer is done by
banks located in the Serbian-controlled part
of Kosovo, which do business with very high
commissions and take up to seven days to
transfer payments.
# The volume of trade with Kosovo done
through the grey channels, according to the
perceptions of the transporters, is between
30-40 percent. This occurs as a result of the
exploitation of various loopholes, such as for-
eign trade currency, usage of non-controlled
roads, etc.
# Serbian products in Kosovo are very well
positioned mostly because of lower prices due
to proximity and low transport costs. Due to
the lack of money-transfer channels with
Kosovo and the lack of bank guarantees as
insurance for payments, everything is done
based on trust.
The illegal trade phenomenon due to legal
loopholes, multiple borders, border infrastruc-
ture, and a general lack of governance and coop-
eration is unlikely to surprise many given the cur-
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10In a similar fashion, residents of Albanian ethnicity in municipalities of Southern Serbia tend to trade with counterparts in Kosovo.
11Field interviews were conducted in the Sandzak region with 98 business people, in addition to polling and focus groups, in order to provide insight
into peoples' experiences in doing business between Kosovo and Serbia.
rent literature and investigative reporting on the
issue. The porous borders of the past decade are
becoming more regulated every year, but unregu-
lated trade remains a considerable portion of the
present trade activities between Serbia and
Kosovo.
Yet few have closely analyzed the impact of
this unregulated trade both on building healthy
trading relations and in using trade as a means
for connecting and stabilizing the fragile eco-
nomic and political situations in Serbia and
Kosovo.
# AND SOME OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES…
The disincentive of building
legal businesses
The current trade regime does not allow for
strong incentives for the institutionalization of
economic development: the current situation is
trade between people, not between companies
and/or economies, providing no incentive for
small companies to legalize.
For example, with the current trade regime it is
now common practice for many businesspeople
from Kosovo to go to factories in Serbia, buy
goods in cash instead of payments through for-
eign banks, and independently transport the
goods to Kosovo. This suggests some level of
free movement of people, ironically, but not the
support of financial institutions which facilitate
the free movement of
goods. For many banks,
transfers are considered
international within the
trade region of Serbia and
Kosovo, even when the
same bank branch is pres-
ent in both Serbia and
Kosovo. Within Kosovo, most banks use
German swift codes, while banks in Mitrovica
are affiliated with Belgrade branches, having the
distinction as internal transactions. Accordingly,
the cost of transactions is artificially high and
encourages a cash-only economy whereby busi-
nesspeople purchase goods with cash and under-
take transport based on trust rather than set
business mechanisms. While the 'trust only' cul-
ture is not bad, it stymies attempts to put in place
predictable financial and administrative channels
for conducting business and provides little basis
for developing a strong set of legal small enter-
prises.
The middleman phenomenon
Common experience and wisdom in the West
Balkans suggests that doing business together
does not necessarily depend on ethnicity.
During the past decade, some of the most effi-
cient and profitable businesspeople were those
who cooperated with their supposed enemies,
often in illegitimate business but based on com-
mon interest rather than larger philosophical
considerations. The premise of common inter-
est is also cited as a base for rebuilding or build-
ing mutually useful businesses between nations
and peoples. Larger internationally supported
plans for greater energy interconnection within
the region are based on a mutual level of need
and interest.
Yet the middleman phenomenon, which has
developed to find ways to do relatively legiti-
mate business between Kosovo and Serbia,
appears to reinforce mono-ethnic linkages
rather than create an opportunity for multieth-
nic partnerships. For example, Albanians that
live in southern Serbia and Serbs that live in
northern Kosovo often act as the interlocutors
for their respective busi-
ness interests, which the
increase in the Mitrovica
border-crossing traffic at
least seems to suggest.
And perhaps even more
importantly, the middle-
man phenomenon is creat-
ing a class of people who have an interest in the
ethnically tense and murky status quo situation.
The institutionalization of the middleman has
kept prices lower and maintained a certain struc-
ture of the economy with trading as the main
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The absence of direct payment
arrangements is a serious
impediment to legal trade 
business. This it is not the way to create a real
and diverse economy, nor is it a way to foster
business interests free of ethnic considerations.
As long as ethnic-based business deals require
the Serbs of Mitrovica and the Albanians of
Southern Serbia, the potential for a softening of
political positions by these parties is unlikely.
Missed government revenue
The current trade regime provides customs-free
exchange, but VAT is levied on imports. And
while the current system does provide some level
of tax revenue to benefit both governments, the
discrepancies in border data suggest that a good
portion is missing. Both Serbia and Kosovo have
it in their best interest to more accurately track
and control the flow of goods between Kosovo
and Serbia for the practical issue of revenue col-
lection. While the trade flows are clearly uneven,
accurate attribution of taxes to the relevant
authorities will contribute to improving the tax
collection regimes of Serbia and Kosovo and
allow government coffers to attribute these funds
to challenged budgets.
Designing economic plans 
without fundamental data
Not only do these types of informal transfers
clearly represent lost revenue for the tax authori-
ties in Serbia and authorities in Kosovo, they dis-
tort the true trade, present and potential, for eco-
nomic development. Government officials in
Kosovo and Serbia are unlikely to have more
detailed information than has been made available
for this report. And without a clearer picture of
economic development potentials, planners have
little inspiration for new and innovative ways to
think about economic development. This
becomes a self-perpetuating cycle where the cur-
rent policies encourage and contribute to the gray
economy in both Kosovo and Serbia. Yet the lack
of real understanding of the interactions and lev-
els of the gray economy hinder the governments
from providing incentives to legalize these com-
panies, which bodes ill for longer-term economic
development perspectives.
Additional incentives for trafficking 
of illegal goods
Finally, the current trade situation not only pro-
vides a disincentive for legitimizing business but
also an incentive for the further criminalization of
business, including the use of the region as a con-
venient smuggling corridor for illegal goods. The
much discussed Balkan gateway into Europe
remains a very real concern, and the current trade
regime only encourages unaccountable players to
see the region as a transit area for illegal goods to
the EU. While far from complete, the trend data
on Kosovo and Serbia as transit areas for legal
trade to the EU suggests that there is real poten-
tial for the region to be an important transit corri-
dor beyond the current transit area for primarily
Greek and Turkish goods. At the same time, the
geographical position of Serbia and Kosovo
remains attractive for illegal goods as long as the
trade regimes and border crossings foster unregu-
lated trade.
# CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Serbia and Kosovo had long been part of a
single economy, which resulted in complemen-
tarity of economic needs and trade potential for
each entity in former Yugoslavia. Since the con-
flicts of the 1990s, separate policies have led the
economies of Serbia and Kosovo in two distinct
directions.
Different conditions have been created for
trade in Serbia and Kosovo. Different trade
regimes have influenced evident divergences in
the development of the economic structures of
Kosovo and Serbia, and mutual trade has natural-
ly suffered.
The regulatory framework, providing free
movement of goods between Serbia and
Kosovo, as well as its enforcement have
improved. But there are still many obstacles to
harmonized trade regimes, most of which are
not directly dependent on the legal status of
Kosovo.
Each customs territory, with the autonomous
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creation and execution of its trade policy, tends to
regulate its trade relations with the most significant
trading partners. Contrary to expectations estab-
lished under the Stability Pact for SEE, trade
between Serbia and Kosovo has not been regulat-
ed and is not liberalized. Serbia has made some ini-
tial steps by adopting regulations that apply to
companies from Serbia when they trade with
Kosovo. But the lack of regime harmonization,
together with the lack of financial and administra-
tive systems to ease this trade, has resulted in lim-
ited regular trade and the strengthening of gray
economy trade and economic activities.
Harmonization and eventual adoption of the
acquis communautaire of the EU is the objective
for both Serbia and Kosovo. As each customs
territory has the ability to reform towards these
European standards, clear steps towards reaching
these trade standards in coordination with deep-
er involvement and integration into the regional
arrangements and structures (trade, energy, and
transport) will give a new impetus to mutual
trade.
The Serbian government is treating trade issues
with Kosovo as part of the larger frame defining
the final status for Kosovo. However, regardless
of the status of Kosovo's external sovereignty, it
has been recognized as a distinct customs entity;
hence, its trade relations are not expected to
change in respect to the negotiation process.
Trade between Kosovo and Serbia needs to be
regulated in order to serve the interests of entire
communities, not just those of certain business
groups. And while the introduction of a VAT
system in Serbia appears to be serving as a better
regulator of many trade flows between Serbia
and Kosovo, it is also opening up another com-
plicated set of issues impeding liberal trade rela-
tions between the two sides.
According to the IMF, Kosovo will most likely
face a tight budget situation with a large budget
constraint and the possibility of facing a pay-
ment crisis in 2006.12 Also, since Kosovo is a
separate customs territory, it technically could
put in place customs duties on goods coming
from Serbia that could potentially add around
EUR 10-15 million of revenues to its coffers.
This is not in the spirit of the Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) signed between all SEE states
under the auspices of the Southeast European
Stability Pact.
The interest of both is to more accurately have
oversight over trade flows for revenue and eco-
nomic planning. Serbia and Kosovo's significant
trade imbalances are not viable in the long run,
and economic ties need to be deepened and
diversified. The interest of Serbia is to improve
economic ties with Kosovo because it is an
important export market. The interest of
Kosovo, although similar in nature, comes from
a different perspective. Kosovo is improving its
industrial capacities, and while they currently are
focused on the local market, in the near future
there will be an interest in launching products to
the regional market as well.
Accordingly, the improvement of trade ties
between Serbia and Kosovo will help in the res-
olution of the political problems between these
entities. Subsequently, trade could once again
prove to be a powerful tool in providing and
strengthening security, stability, and political
cooperation.
With this in mind, the following recommenda-
tions are put forward:
To officials in Belgrade and Pristina…
# Adhere to and implement the spirit of SEE
Free Trade Agreements: Officials on both
sides should agree in principle that technical
trade relations should be disentangled from
the results of the Kosovo status talks. Any
future arrangements in the trade regime
between Serbia and Kosovo should be in
accordance with the implementation of the
Free Trade Agreements among SEE countries
and establishment of the multilateral free
trade area in South Eastern Europe (as agreed
in Sofia at the end of 2004).13
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12AIDE MEMOIR of the IMF Staff Mission to Kosovo, July 14-25, 2005; page 2.
13Kosovo, as a separate customs territory with no political sovereignty, complicates the matters of its inclusion into the Free Trade Area created in South
East Europe under the auspices of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (Stability Pact). The Stability Pact defined Kosovo as part of Serbia and
Montenegro under international administration in the preamble of the free trade agreement, but later in the text of the agreement Kosovo is treated as all
other contracting parties. In this way, Kosovo is included in the free trade area in Southeast Europe.
# Consider trade relations as a technical not
political portion of status talks: The trade
regime between Kosovo and Serbia should be
liberal regardless of final political status. The
process and outcome of status negotiations
should not hinder work towards creating a lib-
eral economic regime.
In practice this means that officials in both
Kosovo and Serbia need to apply the trade agree-
ments in the spirit of a liberal economic regime,
where they will seek to:
# Develop administrative mechanisms for joint
border cooperation: Clear steps in this direc-
tion are initializing draft agreements for the
cooperation of security bodies in the zone of
the administrative line; forming a contact
service for the cooperation of the police, cus-
toms, and the service for administrative con-
trol; and restructuring the regime for adminis-
trative line crossing.
# Standardize and regularly cross-check trade
flow data: In order to combat illegal trade,
there is a need to improve and coordinate
data collection and technical provisions which
can be put in place to better track and coordi-
nate approaches.
Put in place regular comparisons of data-
customs authorities on both sides should
establish a regular quarterly cross-check of
data on the main volumes of imports and
exports in order to reduce the dispropor-
tions shown in this paper.
Data collection methods should be fur-
ther harmonized with EU standards.
As well, both administrations should see their
commitments to trade as part of a larger commit-
ment to improving the environment.
# Direct payment facilitation: Direct payment
facilitation: As there are no clear and consis-
tent direct payment arrangements and legal
payments primarily go through international
banks, which charge high commissions, we
suggest the establishment of direct payment
relations between the banks of Kosovo and
the banks in Serbia to be considered; and
thus, there would be no necessity for interna-
tional intermediary banks, significantly lower
the costs of foreign trade payments in trade
between Kosovo and Serbia
# Encouragement of regional investments:
Economic ties need to be deepened and
diversified-not only in trade but also invest-
ments and common production, which should
be encouraged through the chambers of com-
merce or similar bodies.
And to the EU governments 
and International Community…
# Support the technical improvements of trade
regimes: Contact Group members should
support a structure for the status talks where
trade issues between Kosovo and Serbia can
proceed in a timely manner and are part of
early technical discussions rather than
dependent on political agreement on final sta-
tus outcomes.
# Support trade transfer upgrades and harmo-
nization: The International Community,
through its regional and intergovernmental
mechanisms, should ensure that free trade
regimes are strengthened by:
Support to upgrade the EU standards in
data collection.
Simplify the transit of goods through
Kosovo and Serbia to third markets by
more closely linking larger regional transit
plans and projects, such as REBIS (the
Regional Balkans Infrastructure Project), the
Trade and Transport Facilitation in
Southeast Europe Program (TTFSE), and
Integrated Border Management.
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CHAPTER II
IMPLICATIONS 
OF A GHETTO WITHIN A
BALKAN GHETTO
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In this globalized and post-1989 world, the
people of the West Balkans are part of the
minority of Europe that has experienced a con-
stricted ability to move. Residents of former
Yugoslavia, unlike populations to the north and
east, were accustomed to moving more or less as
needed for business and pleasure. And the loss of
this freedom of movement, even within the SEE
region, cannot be overemphasized when describ-
ing the state of the West Balkans today. In
essence, the current visa regimes have not only
created a now much-cited Balkan ghetto but a
Balkan ghetto within a ghetto.
The number of conflicts in the region during
the 1990s had an impact on the entire society. It
worsened the social distances between Albanians
and Serbs, as well as increased the perceived dis-
tance regarding other neighbors as well.
Freedom of movement of people-as a basic
human right and European Community free-
dom-remains a significant and multifaceted
problem in the postwar Balkans. Enclaves of
small communities scattered among different
ethnicities and increased difficulties for traveling
in the region and abroad-two new circumstances
for most inhabitants of former Yugoslavia-fur-
ther reduce the possibility of contact with other
ethnicities and result in the creation of prejudice
and mistrust towards others.
And while the residents of Kosovo and Serbia
are generally aware of the importance of free-
dom of movement, there is a growing trend that
many have not personally experienced this free-
dom. Not only have older generations lost their
previous mobility, but a whole generation of res-
idents of Serbia and Kosovo see their regional
identity, not to mention their European identity,
as an abstract idea rather than a means of
engagement.
The most striking conclusion of the opinion
polls and focus groups conducted in Kosovo and
Serbia is that contacts within the region are
decreasing. This is strengthening stereotypes and
deeply rooted prejudices about neighbors even as
most acknowledge the need for good relations.
And contrary to expectations, regional integra-
tion has slowed. In other words, the pockets of
states and peoples within the region are becom-
ing more and more isolated from the rest of
Southeast Europe, as the region itself experi-
ences a limited ability to engage with Europe.
General importance of the freedom 
of movement
The enormous social problems that are preva-
lent in both Serbia and Kosovo, from high unem-
ployment to a lack of basic health services and
many others, often make freedom of movement
less of a priority.14 Pessimism was the predomi-
nant feeling regarding the future of Serbia: more
than half questioned Serbia's direction. The situ-
ation on the Kosovo side holds a more optimistic
tone yet still yields similar questions. Given over-
whelming domestic problems, it is not surprising
that freedom of movement was not spontaneous-
ly mentioned among the problems respondents
are most concerned with. Overall, the level of
optimism was strongly related to household
income per capita and age. Students, experts, and
especially businesspeople usually come from
groups of higher income compared to the gener-
al population and exhibit more concern for other
problems. There was significant agreement that
freedom of movement should be enjoyed by all,
not only to visit relatives but as a necessary con-
dition to acquire new knowledge about other cul-
tures.
Links with people from other countries, be
they EU countries or regional countries, were
evaluated as important by the vast majority of
respondents. This perception is important
because the fundamental right for freedom of
movement is actually part of addressing the
larger socioeconomic challenges. For example,
the survey showed over two-thirds of the
respondents in Serbia believed that loosening
control at the borders would speed up econom-
ic development.
As well, most respondents in both Kosovo (90
percent) and Serbia (80 percent) perceived that
links with people from other countries are
important for the future of Serbia and Kosovo.
And for Kosovo respondents, cooperation is not
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# OVERVIEW
14According to opinion polls, respondents from both Serbia and Kosovo are mostly concerned with social issues, particularly unemployment. In Serbia,
respondents were predominantly concerned with unemployment (< 60 percent), low living standard (< 35 percent), various aspect of the economy (< 25
percent), and crime and corruption (16 percent and 15 percent respectively).
only a term that experts understand but one that
has become important for all participants of
focus groups and the general public, who see
that Kosovo is in need of the exchange of expe-
riences with countries of the region. For partic-
ular stakeholder groups, such as students,
experts, and businesspeople, cross-border links
were even more important, compared to the gen-
eral population.
Most of the respondents interviewed in Serbia
and Kosovo evaluated the improvement of rela-
tions with all neighboring countries as quite
important for the future. Respondents in Serbia
saw current relations with Macedonia, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary as good, somewhat less
good with Bosnia and Herzegovina, bad with
Croatia, and extremely bad with Kosovo and
Albania. But the importance of improved rela-
tions was evaluated high for all of the countries,
with the exception of Albania. Similarly, respon-
dents in Kosovo saw relations with all their
neighbors as largely positive, with the exception
of Serbia. And while these exceptions on both
sides are troubling, most would generally wish to
travel more, but the current issuing and recogni-
tion of identity documents is dissuading efforts
for movement and interaction.
Travel and visa regime backdrop-three 
levels of freedom of movement
Research for this study focused on both free-
dom of movement within the region and with the
EU, but actually when speaking of freedom of
movement in relation to Kosovo and Serbia, the
research found that there are three levels of
movement that must be considered.15
# Firstly, there is the freedom of movement
within Kosovo and Serbia and to and from
Kosovo and Serbia.
# Secondly, the freedom of movement from
either to other countries in Southeast Europe.
# And, thirdly, freedom of movement should be
considered as the ability for movement from
Kosovo and Serbia to EU countries.
Freedom of Movement between 
and within Kosovo and Serbia
On the first level, respective laws in Kosovo and
Serbia regulate travel documents and travel in and
through Kosovo and Serbia. Taken separately, the
various regulations seem quite straightforward
and predictable, but when compared to each
other, as with trade regime regulations, clear gaps
in complementary regulations exist that render
freedom of movement less free than legally
described.
For example, legal movement in and out of
Kosovo is primarily governed by the United
Nations administration (UNMIK) as outlined in
the Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo. As such, movement
is subject to UNMIK regulations and secondary
legislation including border and boundary cross-
ing points with the line of division between
Kosovo and Serbia classified as a boundary.16
UNMIK documents are valid documentation for
traveling but are received with various levels of
enthusiasm by regional and EU governments.
The situation for the people of the Republic of
Serbia is slightly more straightforward. The
Republic of Serbia defines that residents of the
Republic of Serbia, regardless of their ethnicity,
acquire the citizenship of the Republic of Serbia
and are governed by travel documents of Serbia
and Montenegro (SCG) residents.17 However, con-
sidering the fact that the current Law on
Citizenship does not define circumstances which
exist in the territory of Kosovo, residents of
Kosovo are at the same time citizens and nationals
of the Republic of Serbia, according to the legal
system. In practice this means that many residents
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15Please see Appendix B for a legal overview of the freedom of movement of the people of Serbia and Kosovo.
16Regulation no. 2001/10, amended with Regulation 2003/18.
17Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia ("Official Gazette of SRJ" no. 24/94, 28/96, 68/2002 and "Official Gazette of SCG" no. 12/2005).
61% of Kosovo Albanians have
never been to Serbia, and 63% of
the citizens of Serbia have never
been to Kosovo
of Kosovo hold two identity documents, one SCG
and one UNMIK, for their travel needs.
However, if SCG documents are expired, have
been lost, or Kosovo Albanians do not wish to
use them or have misinformation about their
use18-35 percent of Kosovo Albanians surveyed
think that it is necessary to have a passport to visit
Serbia-then going to Serbia is out of the question
since Serbia does not recognize UNMIK docu-
ments. This affects both Kosovars' ability to trav-
el within Serbia and to go through Serbia in tran-
sit to a third country. Most Kosovo Albanians (56
percent) surveyed, regardless of travel documents,
felt that traveling to Serbia is a risky journey in
general. And this was backed up by the fact that
Kosovo Albanians (30 percent) consider the cur-
rent border regime with Serbia a necessity. They
cite fears of suspicious goods and persons mov-
ing through border crossings.
Residents of Serbia, on the other hand, have the
ability to travel to Kosovo, but most avoid this
due to perceived security problems or lack of
interest. For example, most survey respondents
(from Serbia) expressed the wish to visit neigh-
boring countries, but most were reluctant to go to
Kosovo (63 percent) or Albania (80 percent).
More informed subgroups were less reluctant to
do so (55 percent and 76 percent of students, 55
percent and 65 percent of experts, and 63 percent
and 72 percent of businesspeople). At the same
time, the current administrative border regime
with Kosovo was perceived as detrimental by
most respondents19-almost 60 percent thought
the border regime with Kosovo had detrimental
effects, while less than 10 percent thought the
effect was beneficial.
And it should also be noted that freedom of
movement within Kosovo itself is perceived very
differently by the respective communities. Freedom
of movement is one of the eight standards set for
the government of Kosovo; yet, Kosovo Serbs still
face an immense perceived insecurity when travel-
ing outside of their enclaves, a feeling shared by
Kosovo Albanians when traveling through or to
Serbian populated enclaves. And while it is difficult
to assess the real rates of ethnically motivated
crime, the perceptions of insecurity have discour-
aged many from not only traveling to but within
Kosovo except when necessary.
All of these perceived and real obstacles have
resulted in two populations that do not want to visit
each other, do not understand each other, and do
not recognize each other's common interests.
Freedom of movement in the SEE region
Apart from problems with respect to internal
movement, the populations of Serbia and Kosovo
consider that movement outside Serbia and
Kosovo is difficult. For example, most of the
respondents claimed the current border regimes
with neighboring countries have detrimental
effects. Between 40 and 50 percent in Serbia and
36 percent in Kosovo claim that current border
regimes with Macedonia and Bulgaria have detri-
mental effects on their respective economies, edu-
cation, social system, as well as art and culture,
compared to less than 20 percent in Serbia and 14
percent in Kosovo who thought the effect was
beneficial.
On the side of the residents of Kosovo, travel
documents issued by UNMIK clearly do not solve
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18There are designated places in Kosovo for residents of Kosovo to apply for new SCG documents, but these are generally not utilized except by the
Kosovo Serb and other minority populations.
19The crossing of the administrative line between Kosovo and Serbia is possible at nine locations: Peceno brdo, Madere,
Devojacka cuka, Vrapce, Medevce, Merdare, Susnjak, Rudnica and Tabalije.
Relations
Prejudices
Past Travel
Wish to Travel
Kosovo Albanians think it is important for Kosovo to improve 
relations with Serbia
Residents of Serbia think it is important for Serbia 
to improve relations with Kosovo
Kosovo Albanians think Serbs are dangerous
Serbs think Kosovo Albanians are dangerous
Kosovo Albanians have never been to Serbia
Residents of Serbia have never been to Kosovo
Kosovo Albanians do not wish to travel to Serbia
Residents of Serbia do not wish to travel to Kosovo
29 %
58 %
84 %
67 %
61 %
63 %
84 %
63 %
the problem of free movement in countries of the
region, since in order to enter some countries
(Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina) they need a visa which is often
time consuming, costly, and unpredictable. For
residents of Serbia, travel throughout the region is
growing easier with the dropping of visa require-
ments for such countries as Croatia, BiH, and
Macedonia, even while visas must be obtained
now for travel to Romania, which is likely to be
followed by Bulgaria as it puts in place EU border
requirements.
Opinion-poll and focus-group results reflect
these difficulties. Respondents from Serbia had
more contact with the people from former
Yugoslav republics, and respondents from Kosovo
had a lesser level of contact with immediate neigh-
bors. For example, a majority of respondents from
Serbia have encountered members of other eth-
nicities from former Yugoslavia, but less than half
have ever met a resident of Kosovo.
Approximately half of the population has met
Bulgarians, Romanians, and Hungarians, and only
26 percent have met Albanians. Students were
found to be the group having the least contact
with the population of Kosovo (37 percent) and
Albanians (21 percent). Respondents from
Kosovo have most often encountered Albanians,
followed by people of Serbia and Macedonians.
Respondents from Kosovo have mostly traveled to
Macedonia and Albania.
Existing visa regimes were named by 18 percent
of the general population in Serbia, 23 percent of
students, 23 percent of experts, and 19 percent of
businesspeople as a primary reason for not travel-
ing to neighboring countries. And while the most
often cited reasons for not traveling were lack of
money (64 percent), motivation (every third
respondent), and security concerns (every fifth
respondent), obtaining the necessary visas is close-
ly linked with the other most cited reasons.
Even more troubling is the trend of decreasing
travel for residents of both Kosovo and Serbia in
the last three years due mostly to document
issuance, financial considerations, or security rea-
sons. Only 15 percent of the residents of Serbia
in 2004 traveled to any of the countries in the
region. Unlike Kosovo, the number of people
who traveled in neighboring countries in the last
three years is increasing,20 but the figures are still
far behind the number of travelers in the past, and
destinations are also changing. Former Yugoslav
destinations have been replaced with other neigh-
boring countries-Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
Overall, despite occasional ups and downs,
regional integration has slowed.
And lack of contact with neighbors fuels estab-
lished negative perceptions. When asked to char-
acterize national features of their neighbors,
respondents from both Serbia and Kosovo rarely
responded with "don't know." This is more worri-
some considering that even those that had never
met a person from a neighboring country readily
labeled their neighbor with an adjective.
Consistency in evaluations and the high agree-
ment in perceptions between the general popula-
tion, students, experts, and businesspeople give a
clear indication of the strong presence of stereo-
types. In the case of Serbia, with the exception of
Macedonia and Albania, neighboring countries
which were not part of former Yugoslavia were
more positively evaluated than those that were.
Macedonians, Bulgarians, Romanians, and
Hungarians got a top-neighbor rating, Albanians
and residents of Kosovo (whom they know least)
were evaluated as bad neighbors, while Croatians
and Bosnians were in the middle.
Kosovo respondents gave similar views, rating
Albanians and Macedonians (those neighbors
whom they encountered most frequently) as best
and residents of Serbia as worst. Other neighbors
mostly received medium scores, confirming the
prevalent lack of personal experience. As the data
show, respondents from both Kosovo and Serbia
rated neighbors of countries they traveled to most
frequently as the best and each other consistently as
the worst, the latter conclusion due perhaps to con-
tinuous disputes and lack of information.
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Even respondents who have never
traveled to neighboring countries
readily accept stereotypes 
about them
20According to respondents, 2002 travel was at 6 percent, 2003 at 11 percent, and 2004 at 15 percent.
And with the EU?
It is travel to EU countries that is at the heart of
the common interests of residents of Serbia and
Kosovo. Whether it is travel to new EU members
close by like Hungary, soon-to-be EU members
like Bulgaria and Romania, or to any of the other
EU25, obtaining the necessary permissions to
travel to these countries, either holding a SCG or
UNMIK passport, is often impossible.
Schengen as a disincentive
On Serbia:
The special visa policy of the Schengen states
is applied to residents of Serbia and
Montenegro because it belongs to the so-called
third countries, whose residents must possess a
visa when entering the Schengen zone. The
process of acquiring a visa puts a limitation on
freedom of movement. Prospects for improving
the situation are not good because it cannot be
said with certainty when the visa regime will be
changed, given the slow process of Serbia and
Montenegro's European integration.21
On Kosovo:
Residents of Kosovo who possess a UNMIK-
issued travel document are required to have a
valid Schengen visa for traveling to the countries
of the Schengen zone. The process is very similar
to the one that SCG residents go through apart
from the fact that in most cases it is more diffi-
cult due to some countries (12) of the Schengen
zone not having diplomatic offices in Kosovo.
In some ways, residents of Kosovo have been
more connected with the EU in the recent past.
With the large Albanian Diaspora in EU countries
and the significant international presence in post-
war Kosovo,22 survey respondents from Kosovo
were found to have contact more often with peo-
ple from the EU than with those of the region
(i.e., Romanians).
On the other hand, Serbia has a substantially
smaller percentage of the population that has had
a chance to meet EU citizens or travel to EU
countries. Of those surveyed, 56 percent of the
population had never traveled to any of the EU
countries, and most of those who had, did so in
the past (before 1990). Only 5 percent of the pop-
ulation had a chance to travel to EU countries in
2003 and 2004.
And the possibility of traveling to the EU has
not been evenly spread amongst the population,
even as a majority of the population is familiar
with the visa requirements and regulations.23 As
one might expect, experts and businesspeople had
more chances to travel to EU countries, with only
a quarter of students having never met any EU
citizen and around one-third having met people
from only one or two EU countries.
Yet, even for those most likely to travel, the
unpredictability in securing a visa has played a
role in discouraging attempts to travel. For exam-
ple, almost half of the general population in
Serbia (and 76 percent of students, 70 percent of
experts, and 54 percent of businesspeople) stated
that they had plans to travel to EU countries in
the last five years but were unable to do so. Most
of them cited lack of money as the main reason
for giving up their plans, but a substantial number
named the visa regime as well (35 percent of the
general population, 25 percent of students, 43
percent of experts, and 60 percent of business-
people).
And for Kosovo, respondents cited the lack of
a visa in more than 40 percent of the cases as a
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Between 18-23 percent of the 
people of Serbia and 40 percent 
of the people of Kosovo cite the
current visa regime as the primary
obstacle for travel to EU countries
21Above all, it is necessary to establish efficient and functional mechanism for coordinating the institutions in Serbia and Montenegro at the level of mem-
ber states and at the level of state community with respect to the visa policy.
22The exodus of more than one million Albanians during the conflict of 1999 and large assistance efforts of the International Community exposed them
to EU nations to a higher degree.
23The majority of the population is aware of the visa regimes for neighboring and EU countries. Most of the people were aware that a visa is required for
all EU countries (69 percent of respondents from Serbia and 78 percent of respondents from Kosovo, 81 percent and 89 percent of students in Serbia and
Kosovo respectively, 84 percent and 92 percent of experts respectively, and 90 percent and 94 percent of businesspeople respectively).
reason for not traveling to EU countries. Real
experience on the Kosovo side suggests that of
those planning to travel to an EU country in the
past five years, 48 percent were unable to do so.
When looking at the breakdown among specific
segments of the population, the difficulties are
even clearer-refused visas were cited by 60 percent
of students, 53 percent of experts, and 55 percent
of businesspeople.
Perceptions about difficulties have added to this
partly self-imposed ghetto. Although only 11 per-
cent of the population of Serbia had experience of
being refused a visa, most thought that it was diffi-
cult for an average person to obtain a visa for EU
countries. The percentage of respondents from
Kosovo that have been rejected for an EU visa is
slightly over 24 percent, while the general consen-
sus is that it is very difficult to obtain a visa. The
high figures illustrate that there is a clear opinion on
the difficulties in obtaining a visa regardless of per-
sonal experience. This is particularly true for stu-
dents; the perception is that this group is most
feared by immigration officials in western coun-
tries, hence, students have the most difficulty in
obtaining visas. 82 percent of all respondents in
Serbia and 78 percent of Kosovo Albanians think
that it is hard to get a visa for EU countries, 72 per-
cent of respondents from Serbia and 84 percent
from Kosovo think the main problem is collecting
all the documentation needed for applying; 69 per-
cent of Serbia respondents and 58 percent of
Kosovo respondents claim that the key problem is
the shortage of money.
According to respondents in both Kosovo and
Serbia, required documentation and money are
the most important elements in securing a visa,
while embassy clerks were found to be the least
important. Collecting necessary documents (a
long procedure) and waiting in line to apply for a
visa were evaluated as difficult by almost half of
the general population and by a substantially high-
er percentage of students, experts, and business-
people. For the last three groups, waiting in line to
apply for a visa was the most difficult part of the
procedure, most likely due to concerns about
meeting their obligations and the often rather
humiliating procedures and attitudes they
encounter in particular.
These difficulties lead to the search for alterna-
tive identification documents. Whether it is an
UNMIK holder obtaining SCG documents out-
side proper channels or a SCG passport holder
obtaining a passport from neighboring countries
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A. Z., a student from Belgrade,
was accepted to study Swedish 
as a foreign language at the
Folkuniversitetet of Stockholm.
The course ran from July 2005 to
January 2006 and consisted of 60
academic hours over a four-week
period, full-time studies, at a cost
of 4,500 SEK. A. Z. provided the
Swedish Embassy in Belgrade
with all relevant documentation,
including proof of ownership of
real estate. A. Z.'s visa applica-
tion was rejected with no expla-
nation or legal remedy 
V. B. was admitted in February of
2003 to the Hochschule fur
Musik Detmold Abteilung
Munster in piano studies. She was
required to start her studies in
October of the same year. From
the moment she was admitted
until the end of September, she
continuously applied for a visa
and was refused without further
explanations. Consequently, she
lost her chance to attend studies
in a prominent institution offer-
ing a high-quality education
with more accessibility to the EU25, this con-
tributes to the lack of effective monitoring of the
movement of people and supports an ever greater
tendency for the EU to perceive the need for
being "Fortress Europe." 
The reality that obtaining a Schengen visa is a
difficult task, even when sought for higher educa-
tion purposes, is unfortunately not surprising. Yet
the very people who can serve as the agents of
change and integration for the region are the ones
most often seeking and accordingly being denied
visas, a practice that goes against European
Council directives to promote the mobility of
third-country nations to the Community for
study.24
Accordingly, it is no surprise that the effects of
the border regime with EU countries were evalu-
ated as detrimental almost unanimously by all the
respondents in Kosovo and Serbia, in all areas-
from the economy to sports. Most people stated
that not needing a visa to go to neighboring coun-
tries would make a lot of difference to them per-
sonally, and even more if they would not need a
visa to go to EU countries.
The key benefits of visa-free travel in the region
and to EU countries were of a pragmatic nature
(increased possibility to travel, visiting friends and
relatives more frequently, saving time, etc.), as well
as of general value (more freedom of movement,
feeling of being a citizen of the world, more
opportunity for development of society) and
important to professional/business opportunities.
Although pragmatic reasons were cited most
often, a substantial percentage of respondents
named general values and professional reasons as
most important. Visa-free travel to EU and neigh-
boring countries would bring about the greatest
value for younger residents.
There was a high level of agreement amongst
the general population that the biggest losers in
the current border regime issue are people who
have relatives and friends in neighboring or EU
countries. Students, experts, and businesspeople
often perceived themselves as the biggest losers of
the current visa regime with neighboring coun-
tries, with an emphasis on EU countries.
# AND SOME OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES…
The impact of different perceptions 
The current border regime and lack of legal
coherence on movement between Kosovo and
Serbia has hampered free movement of all resi-
dents of Kosovo and Serbia. This has contributed
to one of the largest discrepancies in attitudes
found in the survey, namely that of the safety of
travel or in maintaining the status quo. The feeling
of insecurity to travel in Kosovo or Serbia or as
minorities in Kosovo coupled with unclear border
policies contribute to the perception that resi-
dents of Kosovo see the current border regime as
a protection while residents of Serbia see it as
detrimental.
A market for false documents 
At least on the Kosovo side, the UNMIK pass-
port is not as useful as an SCG passport, an SCG
passport not as useful as the Croat passport, and
so forth. The lack of recognition of UNMIK
passports by Serbia, combined with the still stig-
matized status of SCG passports, has contributed
to a gray market of travel documents. This does
not benefit any of the governments of the region
in their attempts to achieve EU ID standards.
Slowing of regional integration 
The number of people who traveled in neighbor-
ing countries in the last three years is increasing, but
the figures are still far below the number of travel-
ers in the past, and the destinations are also differ-
ent. Regional integration as a prerequisite for the
larger process of European integration is slowing
down. The dramatic decrease of communication
within the region and the slowing of regional coop-
eration are evident. Most residents of Serbia and
Kosovo have not recently traveled in any of the
countries in the region. This bodes ill for knowing
and interacting with neighbors.
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24 European Council directive 2004/114/EC says:
(6) One of the objectives of Community action in the field of education is to promote Europe as a whole as a world centre of excellence for studies and
vocational training. Promoting the mobility of third-country nationals to the Community for the purpose of studies is a key factor in that strategy.
The approximation of the Member States' national legislation on conditions of entry and residence is part of this.
Under the given circumstances, and parallel to
the regional ghettoization, the presence of nega-
tive stereotypes and prejudices is extremely strong.
These cannot be overcome without communica-
tion. The situation can hardly be changed under
the condition of isolation.
Negativity breeds negativity
Social pessimism is a predominant feeling in the
region and in Serbia specifically. At the same time,
respondents show a high awareness of the impor-
tance of links with people from other countries
(regional and EU). And people who had the
chance to travel more were found to be more
optimistic with regard to the future of the coun-
try. While those who could travel were likely to
also have better education and socioeconomic
standings, this is a good indicator of what free
travel can do for a population's attitudes.
Conversely, restriction of travel opportunities fur-
ther feeds the feeling of the majority of the pop-
ulation in Kosovo and Serbia that the future holds
little that is positive to take a stake in.
Negative selection in the freedom 
of movement
Deterring or discouraging travel of business-
people, students, and those with legitimate family
and professional reasons further decreases the
chances of a moderate course of development
and European integration for the societies of
Serbia and Kosovo. Most respondents feel that
they are the biggest losers in the current border
regime, while the biggest winners are smugglers,
corrupt customs officers, and politicians. And
those particularly cited as being on the losing side
are young people. Without a reversal of this neg-
ative selection, there are few incentives to "play by
the rules" in order to get ahead.
# CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The inability of residents to travel between
Kosovo and Serbia, within the region, and out
of the region contributes to stereotypes, pes-
simism, and the difficult financial realities. The
research suggests some disturbing trends in
Serbia and Kosovo and more generally in the
region. The day-to-day concerns of survival
and a general feeling of pessimism about the
future dominate. A region that was beset by war
and dislocation continues to disintegrate on
many other levels. The absence of regional inte-
gration is by far the biggest dilemma. In
essence, people in Serbia and Kosovo do not
know one another. The deep-seated stereotypes
prevail owing to a lack of information and com-
munication.
Residents of Serbia do acknowledge that there
is great importance in strengthening links and
cooperation in the region and with the EU.
However, there is less importance attached to
breaking down regional barriers. As a result, res-
idents of Serbia are increasingly getting to know
their northern neighbors and developing a
greater distance from other neighbors from for-
mer Yugoslavia. The situation in Kosovo is sim-
ilar, where residents are getting to know their
southern and EU neighbors rather than their
northern neighbors. In addition, the absence of
a developed regional infrastructure ensures that
people find it difficult to move around the
region.
The EU visa regime is a problem for a num-
ber of reasons: professional and business con-
cerns, practical reasons, and an obstacle to cre-
ating "shared values." This last reason can be
described as a feeling of belonging to the world,
of a common European perspective, and an
interest in the democratic as well as economic
development of the region. People continue to
feel trapped within their borders, and without
more opportunities to experience life as part of
Europe, the community of European values
will continue to be more rhetoric than reality
for a majority of residents of Serbia and
Kosovo.
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With this in mind, the following recommenda-
tions are put forward:
To officials in Belgrade and Pristina…
Movement between Serbia and Kosovo
The discrepancy in attitudes between respon-
dents from Kosovo and Serbia suggests that
both governments need the political will to solve
practical problems hampering the current move-
ment of people in and from Kosovo and Serbia.
There is an evident common interest in regulat-
ing the issuing and recognition of personal doc-
uments, which is critical for the free movement
of people, prevention of illegal migrations and
human trafficking, and for improving the posi-
tion of Kosovo and Serbia in negotiations with
the EU.
# Make freedom of movement of people a
technical, not political, issue in Kosovo
status talks: A dialogue between the authori-
ties of Serbia and Kosovo regarding the har-
monization of domestic laws with European
ones and improving conditions related to
freedom of movement must start as soon as
possible and should be seen as a complement,
not an outcome, of Kosovo status talks. In
this regard, we urge both governments to:
Adopt new packages of legislation rules (in
the areas of visas regime, migration, asylum,
and integrated borders management and
information system), according to the
European standards, and develop the
reform agenda to be implemented by
Serbian and Kosovo authorities simultane-
ously with the status talks.
# Recognition of UNMIK documents:
Residents of Kosovo are hemmed in by their
travel documents. Serbia's refusal to recognize
UNMIK travel documents is by far the great-
est problem. Serbia's recognition of these
documents would greatly facilitate travel
between and in Kosovo and Serbia (Kosovar
documents are already recognized by other
countries of the region).
Steps towards this include:
Legislation of the Republic of Serbia should
be adapted to address actual circumstances
through the adoption of new laws on pass-
ports and citizenship.
Recognition by the Republic of Serbia of
UNMIK documents.
Clear reciprocal measures by Kosovar
authorities to provide for an improvement
in the safety of Kosovo Serbs and other
minorities, as well as Serbs entering and
remaining in the territory of Kosovo.
# Introduction of biometric identity docu-
ments: The experience from Bulgaria and
Romania has shown that the introduction of
more stringent standards for identity docu-
ments can significantly contribute to reconsid-
eration of visa regimes by the EU. We encour-
age Serbia and Kosovo to take advantage of
and learn from the positive experience of
neighboring countries that have made clear
advancement in the field of border control,
visas, and regional cooperation, which enabled
them to be placed on the "white Schengen list."
To governments in the SEE region… 
# Facilitation of the visa regime in the
region: Easing of current UNMIK and SCG
visa requirements for travel within the region
should be the key priority of regional govern-
ments in demonstrating their support of
regional and European integration. The abol-
ishment of lengthy and costly processing
times for neighborhood travel would greatly
contribute to increased travel within the SEE
region.25
The countries in the region, subject to the
strict EU visa regime, should create a com-
mon front and platform for liberating
movement intra-regionally and in region-EU
relations.
# Regional support for liberalization of the
EU visa regime: The SEE region would
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25The authors fully support CEPS' recent recommendation 'to devise a regional Schengen arrangement, whereby the whole of Southeast Europe, member
states or not, would become a visa-free area,' CEPS Neighborhood Watch, Issue 9, October 2005, as well as similar views expressed 
in the forthcoming ICG report.
benefit as a whole if the "ghetto within the
ghetto" were to be disassembled. Accordingly,
we urge the countries in the region (especially
EU member states-Hungary, Greece, etc.) to
support residents of Serbia and Montenegro
and Kosovo in their endeavors to lobby for
the liberalization of the EU visa regime.
# Regional government support for
increased social group interaction:
Governments in the region should support
and encourage their respective educational
and cultural institutions to engage with their
colleagues in the region. The key people to
engage are youth, as they show the highest
readiness to reject stereotypes. Simple meas-
ures like organizing group tours would be an
affordable step towards creating regional
understanding. The problem should be
approached through better communication
and identification of common interests in dif-
ferent fields and strengthening of the regional
context for solving shared problems. Regional
governments can also support and initiate
projects of regional interest at the govern-
mental, NGO, and university levels.
And to the EU governments…
# Support a parallel and technical process of
visa harmonization as status talks begin:
Provide a clear mechanism for status talks to
focus on visa harmonization for Kosovo and
Serbia as part of an early confidence-building
portion of the status talks.
# Adopt a positive discrimination policy for
EU visas: All residents of the region should
not be punished for the behavior of criminal
groups in their society and deprived of free
movement in EU countries.26 Accordingly, we
urge the EU to introduce a "smart visa" poli-
cy for Serbia and Kosovo, which would give
preference to students, businesspeople, and
those who will be key in building their respec-
tive countries. A more relaxed visa regime for
EU countries-especially for experts, business-
people, and students-would help alleviate the
feeling of dislocation, isolation, and would
facilitate and speed up the process of
European integration in the region. The
prospects of free movement of people (even
of some key target groups) in the region and
with the EU would be highly instrumental in
improving control of the borders and dimin-
ishing illegal flows of goods and people.
# Provide technical and financial resources
for visa regime upgrades: The introduction
of biometric identity cards and other border
and visa regime controls will require signifi-
cant input from EU countries. We encourage
the EU, whether under the guise of the
Stability Pact or other regional mechanisms,
to assist in the parallel harmonization and
upgrades.
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26As the International Commission on the Balkans in its Report "The Balkans in Europe's Future," published in 2005, concludes: "A smart visa policy of
the EU that opens its borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing them for criminals should be at the very centre of policies that will
mobilize popular support for building EU member states in the Balkans."
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The walls of the Balkans are legendary, whether it is the stone walls
of Kosovo or the fence lines of Vojvodina. These walls have served a
purpose and are, in themselves, not a problem. Yet the barriers and
regimes that supposedly protect and facilitate are actually impeding the
interconnections necessary for development and European and
regional integration.
Lack of free trade has limited trade and economic opportunities for
the region, providing little incentive for legal goods transfer, responsi-
ble customs and border regimes, or a base for growing the much-need-
ed businesses of the region. At the same time, the inability of the res-
idents of Serbia and Kosovo to travel within Kosovo and Serbia,
throughout the region, and to the European Union reinforces the
ghetto mentality that encourages national extremism and populism,
thus offering more incentives for divisive regional relations than con-
structive common-interest connections.
The beginning of status talks in Kosovo is a historical opportunity
to build highways that connect rather than walls that divide. These
talks should be seen as the opening of a larger process of negotiating
common interests in trade and the movement of peoples. Since the
status talks are likely to be part of a longer-term process, it is particu-
larly critical that Serbia and Kosovo take ownership of their respective
parts of the current impasse on the movement of good and people. It
is likely that the status talks will consist of stages that represent out-
comes neither of one preference or another, suggesting that a contin-
uation of the status quo in relation to the visa and trade regimes will
contribute to undermining the progress the status talks are purporting
to promote.
Political will to change the inconsistencies of the current trade and
visa regimes by the governments of Kosovo and Serbia is crucial. But
this needs to be supported by clear regional will to accept and assist
Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts for greater regional integration and
the achievement of European standards. The EU and the
Internationalscx Community also remain critical players for the
increased liberalization of the region. Support for making the negoti-
ation process one of clear objectives and gains resulting in regional
winners will ultimately serve the best interests of Serbia, Kosovo,
SEE, and the EU. Using status talks to go beyond the status quo is crit-
ical for breaking down the ghetto within the Balkan ghetto.
# CONCLUSION
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# APPENDIX A
Top 10 product groups in the trade of Kosovo and Serbia in 2004 and Q1 2005, in 000'euro
Kosovo imports from Serbia
Product group 2004 - annual No. Product group 2004 - annual
Blocks and bricks 16,236 1 Wine 725
Wheat and flour 10,946 2 Carpets 646
Fertilizers 9,025 3 Heaters 609
Beverages 8,376 4 Scrap metal 463
Other construction 7,712 5 Medicaments 404
Cement and lime 6,324 6 Furniture 189
Tiles 6,322 7 184
Plastic products 4,929 8 150
Source: UNMIK Customs database
Hygienic products 2,344 10 Scrap paper 77
4,225 9 Iron pipes 127
Kosovo exports to Serbia
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Shock 
absorbers
Recording 
and other 
equipment
Corn and
Animal Food
# LEGAL REVIEW
OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Legal framevork of the freedom 
of movement in Kosovo
There is a numerically modest yet solid and
clear legal foundation pertaining to the movement
of persons into and out of Kosovo. According to
the letter of the Constitutional Framework1 the
question of movement of persons falls within the
domain of reserved powers of international
(United Nations') administration. In light of this
constitutional solution, movement of persons
into and out of Kosovo is regulated with UNMIK
regulations and secondary legislation.
Furthermore, in light of the division of responsi-
bilities between civilian and security sectors of
international administration, it is the Special
Representative of the Secretary General who in
consultation with the Commander of KFOR and
the UNMIK Police Commissioner designates
authorized border and boundary crossing points.
According to the Regulation no. 2001/10,2 the
line of division between Kosovo and Serbia is
classified as a boundary and crossing of the same
outside of crossing points is sanctioned as a
crime. Regulation no. 2005/16 is the key legal act
which in more detail regulates movement of per-
sons into and out of Kosovo including those
going through crossing points along the boundary
with Serbia. It stipulates the conditions to be met
for entry into Kosovo, different categories of
entry and stay, remedies in cases of a denial of
entry, etc. In addition, the Regulation spells out in
detail the conditions for refugee status and related
issues.
Aforementioned Regulation (2005/16) is gen-
erous when listing classes of persons who may
enter Kosovo and remain there indefinitely,
including all those who either hold an UNMIK
travel document, hold an identity card indicating
that the bearer is a resident of Kosovo, is a
dependent or under the age of 18, a spouse or
other, or by relevant government authority is
authorized to rest indefinitely in Kosovo. In addi-
tion this Regulation lists another category of per-
sons with no practical distinctions as to the effects
of their entry and the right to indefinite stay in
Kosovo with those already mentioned-all those
who hold a travel document or identity card of
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro are
practically entitled to the same rights as residual
inhabitants of Kosovo.
All other categories of persons may, at a point
of entry, request authorization to remain and stay
temporarily in Kosovo. While Regulation 2005/16
stipulates requirements that such categories shall
meet, it also outlines the framework that shall
govern discretionary powers of border point offi-
cers and grounds on which certain actions related
to movement into and out of Kosovo may be
denied. Furthermore, legal remedies are guaran-
teed for those denied entry or authorization to
enter and remain in Kosovo, those that are denied
or terminated refugee status, or individuals whose
travel documents are seized. All the categories in
question are entitled with the right to have deci-
sions in question reviewed by the court.
Legal Framework on the Freedom 
of Movement in Serbia
Regulations of the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro (SCG) and the Republic of Serbia
which deal with the freedom of movement are:
Law on Citizenship, Law on Traveling Documents
of Yugoslav Citizens, Law on Movement and Stay
of Foreigners, SCG Law on Asylum, and
Regulation on Control of the Crossing of the
Administrative Line.
Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia
("Official Gazette of SRJ" no. 24/94, 28/96,
68/2002, "Official Gazette of SCG" no. 12/2005)
defines that the citizens of the Republic of Serbia,
regardless of their ethnicity, acquire the citizen-
ship of the Republic of Serbia by origin, birth in
the territory of the Republic of Serbia, accept-
ance, and according to international treaties. The
cessation of the citizenship occurs by release,
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1Regulation No.2001/9 on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.
2Amended with Regulation 2003/18.
# APPENDIX B
renouncement, acquiring the citizenship of
another member state and according to interna-
tional treaties. Considering the fact that the cur-
rent Law on Citizenship does not define circum-
stances which exist in the territory of Kosovo, it
can be considered that according to the legal sys-
tem, the citizens of Kosovo are at the same time
citizens and nationals of the Republic of Serbia
unless the reasons for cessation of citizenship
have occurred. Practically, this means that, as citi-
zens of the Republic of Serbia, they have the right
of the freedom of movement and all other rights
guaranteed by the Law and the Constitution.
Law on Traveling Documents of Yugoslav
Citizens ("Official Gazette of SRJ" no. 24/94,
28/96, 68/2002, and "Official Gazette of SCG"
no. 12/2005) regulates the questions of traveling
documents and visas for Yugoslav citizens travel-
ing abroad, types of traveling documents and
visas, and the way of issuing them.
Article 15 of the Law stipulates that the body
responsible for internal affairs issues the passport,
group passport, and visas according to regula-
tions. The body responsible for internal affairs
issues the passport valid for ten years. Documents
that a citizen needs to present to the internal unit
of the Ministry of Interior or diplomatic-consular
department of SCG abroad are: birth certificate,
proof of citizenship, previous passport of SRJ (in
case the citizen owns one, i.e. if he/she is not
applying for the passport for the first time), three
photographs and two completed application
forms for the issuing of the traveling document.
Passports are issued for the period of 10 years
(since the age of 14), 5 years (conscripts), and 2
years (children and children in the parent's pass-
port). The precondition for acquiring a passport is
having an ID for which it is needed to submit
documents in the place of residence. This matter
is regulated by the Law on Identity Documents.
The body in charge of internal affairs is obliged
to answer the application in a period of 15 days.
Rejection of the application is possible when: an
individual applying for the traveling document is
prosecuted, if an individual is convicted to an
unconditional prison punishment longer than
three months, if an individual is denied freedom
of movement in order to prevent an epidemic,
and if it is necessary in order to defend the coun-
try in case of a proclaimed state of war, state of
imminent danger, or emergency.
Yugoslav citizens (term used by the law which
in fact implies citizens of the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro) can have only one travel-
ing document of the same type. Considering the
abovementioned solutions from the Law on
Traveling Documents of Yugoslav Citizens, it can
be seen that there is a clear procedure of issuing
traveling documents, and that in the limited frame
defined by law, a person applying for the traveling
document can be denied one.
Since the largest number of birth registers have
been dislocated from the territory of Kosovo,
Kosovo inhabitants who need or want to have the
documents necessary for the issuing of a pass-
port, replace or extend the validity of already
issued documents (IDs and traveling documents),
or to acquire the blue passport can do so in dislo-
cated organizational units of the Ministry of
Interior of the Republic of Serbia, which are situ-
ated on the territory of Serbia.
For the traveling documents issued by the SCG
diplomatic-consular departments, consular fees
according to the Law on Federal Administrative
Fees ("Official Gazette of SRJ" no. 81/94, 61/95,
63/96, 29/97, 12/98, 59/98, 44/99, 74/99,
73/2000, 21/2001 and 71/2001) are charged.
Law on Movement and Stay of Foreigners3
regulates the questions of defining a foreigner,
stay of foreigners, registration of residence, docu-
ment for establishing identity, evidence and
authorities of the bodies which deal with these
issues (offices for internal and foreign affairs). A
foreigner can be denied access to the SCG (the
law uses the old name SFRJ), which can limit and
forbid movement for reasons of protection of
public order and interest in defending the country
as well as reasons which come from international
relations.
Regulation on Control of the Crossing of the
Administrative Line ("Official Gazette of SRJ"
no. 41/2002) defines places where it is allowed to
cross the administrative line. Permits for move-
ment and stay of individuals are issued only for
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3("Official Gazette of SFRJ" no. 56/80, amended by the amendments published in "Official Gazette of SFRJ" no. 53/85, 30/89, 26/90; "Official
Gazette of SRJ" no. 24/94, 28/96, 68/2002; "Official Gazette of SCG" no. 12/2005).
working on land, pasture of cattle, hunting and
fishing, and exploitation of forests and other nat-
ural resources. An individual who crosses or stays
on the administrative line is obliged to act accord-
ing to the order of the authority (Ministry of
Interior of the Republic of Serbia) and Joint
Security Forces.
Crossing of the administrative line between
Serbia and Kosovo is possible on nine locations
controlled by the Ministry of Interior of the
Republic of Serbia. Although the Serbian police
control these crossings, as well as other border
crossings, the coordination of the work of state
bodies and other affairs related to the border
regime is done by the SCG Ministry of Foreign
Affairs together with the Ministries of Interior of
the Republics.
When the set of laws dealing with the freedom
of movement is considered, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the Regulation which deals with the issue of
asylum. The Federal Parliament adopted on
March 21, 2005, a Law on Asylum ("Official
Gazette of SCG" no. 12/2005), which regulates
the questions of asylum, foreigners, individuals
asking for asylum, and individuals with a recog-
nized refugee status. The law gives the right to
foreigners to apply for asylum and the application
is decided by the authority within a period stipu-
lated by the Law. During the procedure of granti-
ng asylum, any kind of discrimination is forbid-
den; deportation or restitution, and the security of
data is assured; as well as the unity of family and
cooperation with the High Commissionaire for
Refugees. It is defined that the individuals asking
for asylum and refugees are to be guaranteed the
right of stay and complete protection according
to the law, integration in the society, and humani-
tarian protection, which undoubtedly adds to the
realization of the right to the freedom of move-
ment.
In the area of visas, the key decision was
brought by the SCG Council of Ministers on May
29, 2003. The Decision on the Abolishment of
Visas for entering and stay in Serbia and
Montenegro defines the current visa policy of
SCG. By the Decision of the SCG Council of
Ministers, visas are abolished for entering and stay
in SCG for the period of 90 days for all traveling
documents for the citizens of all 25 EU countries
and Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Monaco,
Lichtenstein, Vatican City, Andorra, San Marino,
Israel, Croatia, USA, Canada, Singapore, Republic
of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
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